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A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 
THE MORTGAGEE’S POWER OF SALE IN QUEENSLAND 
 
Bill Dixon  and Michelle Backstrom   
 
In Australia, the extent of a mortgagee‟s duty when exercising power of sale has long 
been the subject of conjecture.  With the advent of global financial crisis in the latter part 
of 2008, there has been some concern to ensure that the interests of mortgagors are 
adequately protected.  In Queensland, concern of this type resulted in the enactment of 
the Property Law (Mortgagor Protection) Amendment Act 2008 (Qld).  This article 
examines the impact of this amending legislation which was hastily introduced and 
passed by the Queensland Parliament without consultation and which introduces a level 
of prescription in relation to a sale under a prescribed mortgage which is without 
precedent elsewhere in Australia. 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
With an amalgam of statutory and common law duties, great care has always 
been required when considering the obligations of either mortgagees or receivers 
when exercising power of sale.  Unfortunately, the position has only become 
more complicated in Queensland with the enactment of the Property Law 
(Mortgagor Protection) Amendment Act 2008 (Qld).  
 
1.2 Background 
 
As explained in the explanatory notes accompanying the amending legislation, 
with current global economic and financial circumstances, there were concerns 
about the position of mortgagors when mortgagees exercised their powers of 
sale.  The objective of the amending legislation was to protect the interests of 
mortgagors by strengthening the statutory provisions relating to the duty of the 
mortgagee exercising power of sale to take reasonable care to ensure the 
property is sold at market value.  Premier Anna Bligh noted that the amendments 
would protect struggling homeowners, from fire sales where mortgagees 
intentionally sold properties at below market value at prices merely sufficient to 
discharge the mortgagee‟s debt leaving the homeowner with little or no equity.1   
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The amending legislation was passed on the day of its introduction, 3 December 
2008,2 and received assent on 4 December 2008.  There was no consultation 
process3 and the Bill was not amended in its passage through Parliament.  The 
amendments commenced by proclamation on 12 December 2008.4 
 
2.1 Section 85 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)  
 
While the extent of the mortgagee‟s duty when exercising power of sale has long 
been the subject of conjecture elsewhere in Australia, the law in Queensland is 
clearly stated and requires the mortgagee to maintain a high standard in relation 
to the sale of property.  Section 85 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) obliges a 
mortgagee exercising power of sale to take reasonable care to ensure the 
property is sold at market value.5  To this extent, s 85 resolved the debate that 
continued elsewhere that a mortgagee not only has a duty to act in good faith but 
also a duty to take reasonable care to ensure the property is sold at market 
value.6  
 
2.2 Property Law (Mortgagor Protection) Amendment Act 2008 (Qld) 
 
With the passing of the Property Law (Mortgagor Protection) Amendment Act 
2008 (Qld), the operation of s 85 has been both extended and strengthened.  
The effect of the amendments to s 85 is to extend the duty imposed under s 85 to 
situations where property is sold by a receiver under a delegated power or by the 
mortgagee acting as attorney for the mortgagor.7  By way of strengthening, to 
satisfy the obligation to take reasonable care to ensure the property is sold at 
market value, s 85(1A) specifies the steps which must be taken by a mortgagee 
or a receiver for a „prescribed mortgage‟.8 
 
Under the terms of the Property Law Regulation 2003 (Qld), for the purposes of s 
85, a mortgage is a prescribed mortgage if it is a mortgage over residential land 
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and the mortgagor‟s home is on the land.9  The regulation further provides that it 
does not matter that a residence is also used for a business purpose if the 
residence is primarily used as the mortgagor‟s home. 
 
In relation to a prescribed mortgage, the steps that must be taken by a 
mortgagee or a receiver, unless the mortgagee or receiver has a reasonable 
excuse, are: 
 
 Adequately advertise the sale;  
 
 Obtain reliable evidence of the property‟s value; 
 
 Maintain the property, including by undertaking any reasonable repairs; 
 
 Sell the property by auction, unless it is appropriate to sell it in another 
way; and 
 
 Do anything else prescribed under a regulation.10 
 
Failure to follow the steps specified in relation to a „prescribed mortgage‟ 
constitutes an offence with the maximum penalty being 200 penalty units.11 
 
Notwithstanding the description of the amending legislation when still a Bill as „a 
very simple and straightforward bill‟,12 a number of the requirements imposed by 
the amended legislation and the supporting regulatory definition of a „prescribed 
mortgage‟ are likely to prove problematic.  A number of these potential issues 
warrant separate consideration. 
 
3.1 Receivership of an individual 
 
Although such receiverships are not common they are certainly not unknown 
particularly in circumstances where there are commercial activities conducted on 
the mortgaged property.  Prior to the enactment of the Property Law (Mortgagor 
Protection) Amendment Act 2008 (Qld), it was settled law that s 85 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) had no application to a sale by a receiver13 and with 
the mortgagor being an individual the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) also had no 
application.  The enactment of the Property Law (Mortgagor Protection) 
Amendment Act 2008 (Qld) was intended to extend the operation of s 85 to 
situations where the mortgaged property of an individual was sold by a receiver. 
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However, it is questionable whether or not the drafting of s 85(1) secures this 
intention.  The difficulty arises from the statutory use of the words: 
 
 or a receiver acting under a power delegated to the receiver by a mortgagee 
 
A dictionary definition of a „delegate‟ is „one delegated to act for or represent 
another‟.14  On this basis, to fall within the statutory wording it would seem 
necessary for a receiver to be acting under a power whereby the receiver is 
acting for or representing the mortgagee.  To determine whether this is the case 
it is necessary to consider the nature of a privately appointed receiver. 
 
Usually, contractual provisions are included in the mortgage document between 
the mortgagor and mortgagee which provide that any receiver appointed by the 
mortgagee is the agent of the mortgagor and these provisions even extend to 
making the actions and defaults of the receiver the responsibility of the 
mortgagor.  Contractual terms were developed in response to the strict 
obligations imposed on mortgagees in possession under the common law to 
account for what they should have received on sale. 
 
In State Bank of New South Wales v Chia15 it was stated:  
 
The [private] appointment of such a receiver is performed by the mortgagee, however, it 
is invariably the case, and is here the case, that the instrument under which the receiver 
is appointed provides that the receiver is the agent of the mortgagor. 
To make the receiver the agent of the mortgagor is, of course, something of a 
contrivance. … Yet it is a contrivance which has the effect of removing a receiver 
appointed out of court from those classes of persons who may be said to be fiduciaries.
16
  
While the court calls this contractual device a contrivance, it is clear the device is 
effective and, as noted, provisions of this kind will almost inevitably be found in 
the mortgage document and the appointment of the receiver.  As the mortgagor‟s 
agent, it would not be usually considered that a receiver was acting for or 
representing the mortgagee in the manner of a delegate, notwithstanding that the 
appointment is made by the mortgagee.  Further, any receiver that may be 
appointed will exercise powers as a receiver rather than the mortgagee‟s 
delegate.  Accordingly, in making reference to „a receiver acting under a power 
delegated to the receiver by a mortgagee‟, there must be some doubt if s 85(1) 
achieves its desired objective.17 
 
3.2 When is a mortgage a prescribed mortgage? 
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Section 85(1A) applies to prescribed mortgages.  Under s 4(1) of the Property 
Law Regulation 2003 (Qld) a mortgage is a prescribed mortgage if it is a 
mortgage over residential land and the mortgagor‟s home is on the land.  Section 
4(3) goes on to provide that the home, of a mortgagor, means a residence on 
residential land that is occupied by the mortgagor as the mortgagor‟s principal 
place of residence.  A „residence‟ is in turn defined to mean a building fixed to 
land; designed, or approved by a local government, for human habitation by a 
single family unit and used for residential purposes.  Section 4(3) defines 
„residential land‟ to mean „land, or the part of land, on which a residence is 
constructed, and includes the curtilage attributable to the residence if the 
curtilage is used for residential purposes.‟ 
 
A number of observations can be made about this definition and associated 
provisions.  The first is that the definition does not have regard to any town 
planning imperatives associated with the use of the land.18  In this regard, it 
would seem that the construction of a residence on the land is the hallmark of 
residential land for this particular statutory provision.  Second, s 4(2)(a) makes it 
clear that it does not matter that a residence is also used for a business purpose 
provided that the residence is primarily used as the mortgagor‟s home.  In this 
regard, the regulation is silent concerning the situation where the property itself, 
rather than the residence constructed thereon, is primarily used for a business 
purpose.19 
 
The question may arise in a variety of common situations as to whether the 
mortgage falls within the definition.  One common example is where the 
mortgage is over a grazing property and the mortgagor‟s principal place of 
residence is on the property.  Although it may appear counter-intuitive, there 
would appear to be some arguments available to suggest that a mortgage over a 
freehold grazing property where the mortgagor‟s principal place of residence is 
on the land may be a prescribed mortgage.  A contrary argument is that a 
prescribed mortgage should only relate to residential land (including the 
associated curtilage) and to the extent that mortgaged land extends significantly 
beyond simply the land on which a homestead is constructed and the associated 
curtilage it should not be viewed as a prescribed mortgage.  Unfortunately, this 
may represent a provision which will require the judiciary to determine 
parliamentary intent.20  
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3.3 The Obligation to advertise, obtain valuations and sell by auction 
where the mortgage is a prescribed mortgage 
 
Unless there is a reasonable excuse, s85(1A) obliges the mortgagee to 
adequately advertise the sale, obtain reliable evidence of the property‟s value 
and proceed to sell the property by auction, unless it is appropriate to sell it in 
another way. 
 
Advertising 
 
It is reasonably clear from the existing case law that advertising requirements may 
vary with the nature of the sale.  In terms of the case law, it is possible to draw a 
distinction between a private sale and an auction context.  If property is to be sold 
privately, the primary concern for the mortgagee is to ensure market value is 
obtained on the sale.  Provided this occurs a failure to adequately advertise may 
not be important.21  However, s 85(1A)(1)(a) mandates that adequate advertising is 
to occur as a precursor to an auction.  In this regard, the existing case law provides 
guidance because it seems clear that a mortgagee is not entitled to sell a property 
without advertising in the case where the sale is by public auction.22 It is 
important that any advertisements appear in the usual media and at those times 
when other real estate auctions are advertised. This would traditionally be in  
newspapers circulating in the area and today may well extend to advertising on 
the internet.  It is likely more than one advertisement should appear.23  In 
accordance with authority of long standing, the mortgagee will not be absolved from 
liability simply by appointing a real estate agent to act on its behalf.24   
 
In relation to the statutory requirement to undertake „adequate advertising‟, a 
further issue that may arise is whether advertisement as a „mortgagee sale‟ may be 
considered improper.  Consistent with the observations of Palmer J25 in Stockl v 
Rigura Pty Ltd,26 the resolution of this issue may be dependent on the type of 
property being sold and how the words „mortgagee sale‟ are employed in the 
advertising material.27 
 
Evidence of Value 
 
Section 85(1A)(1)(b) imposes an obligation upon the mortgagee to obtain reliable 
evidence of the property‟s value.  To satisfy this statutory obligation, it would be 
expected that a mortgagee would at least obtain one or more reputable 
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independent and current28 valuations29 to protect that mortgagee's position.  Once 
again, it should be noted that this level of statutory prescription strictly exceeds the 
requirements imposed by law on a mortgagee.  There is no principle of law which 
requires a mortgagee to obtain an independent valuation of a property before 
exercising a power of sale30 but what is required is for the mortgagee to take 
reasonable steps to ascertain value which will depend on the circumstances of the 
case. 31 
 
Sell by Auction 
 
The obligation to sell by auction presents a number of uncertainties. Difficult 
issues may  arise where a mortgagee of a prescribed mortgage receives an offer 
to purchase the mortgaged property prior to auction, where no advertising has 
been done but where the offer compares well with valuations obtained.  This may 
be further complicated in a market where clearance rates are low.  Should an 
offer in these circumstances be accepted? 
 
In the context of the obligation imposed on the mortgagee pursuant to s 85(1A), 
two issues arise for consideration.  First, there is potentially a breach of the duty 
to adequately advertise the sale.  Secondly, the statutory prescription for the 
mortgaged property to be sold by auction (unless it is appropriate to sell the 
property in another way) must be considered.  Non-compliance with these 
prescriptions is allowed where the mortgagee „has a reasonable excuse‟.32 
 
Should the mortgagee elect to proceed with a full marketing program, the 
mortgagee would be incurring significant additional expenses in a market where 
auction clearance rates may indicate that no better result would be achieved at 
auction.  By incurring additional expenses the mortgagee may be eroding any 
residual equity in the property at the expense of the mortgagor or subsequent 
mortgagees.  The difficulty for the mortgagee is that a contravention of s 85(1A) 
without reasonable excuse constitutes an offence with the maximum penalty 
being $20,000.  Concern about non-compliance may mean that the mortgagee 
elects not to accept the offer resulting in additional expense being added to the 
                                                 
28
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 Mortgagees should beware of ‘forced sale’ valuations. Skipton Building Society v Stott [2001] QB 261, 
[25]. 
30
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mortgage debt with the mortgagor being worse off, the very result that the 
amending legislation was intended to counteract.33 
 
Further questions arise if a property is passed in at auction after extensive 
advertising because the highest bid was less than the reserve.  In these 
circumstances is it appropriate for a mortgagee to accept a raised offer made 
after auction which is still less than the valuations?  Section 85(1A) provides that 
a mortgagee must, unless the mortgagee has a reasonable excuse, sell the 
property by auction, unless it is appropriate to sell it in another way.  A difficulty 
arises as the statutory wording does not expressly sanction a private sale after a 
property is passed in at an appropriately advertised auction.  Given the realities 
of a falling market and associated low auction clearance rates it is perhaps 
unfortunate if the statutory wording suggests a need to strictly sell at auction. 
 
Common sense would seem to indicate that these circumstances should 
constitute a „reasonable excuse‟ for not selling at auction if that phrase is strictly 
construed or, alternatively, it may be argued that any sale that flows from an 
appropriately advertised auction will suffice provided the mortgagee can still 
demonstrate compliance with the mortgagee‟s paramount obligation being to 
take reasonable care to ensure the property is sold at market value.  It is to be 
hoped that the statutory wording will be construed as a requirement to use the 
auction process as part of the mortgagee‟s paramount obligation rather than an 
end in itself.  
 
Potential difficulty may also arise if the mortgaged property is in an area where 
there are many similar houses and the market has recently been flooded with 
properties of a similar kind which have not successfully sold at auction.  Again, 
the question must arise whether there is still a requirement to sell by auction.  In 
these circumstances arguably it would be appropriate for the mortgagee to 
attempt to sell the property in a way other than by auction.  Once again, however, 
the level of statutory prescription may mean that the mortgagee feels compelled 
to implement an auction process despite the likely futility of this endeavour.  
 
3.4 Obligation to repair 
 
Section 85(1A)(1)(c) imposes an obligation upon the mortgagee, unless the 
mortgagee has reasonable excuse, to maintain the property, including by 
undertaking any reasonable repairs.  Difficult issues may arise where the 
mortgage debt already exceeds the value of the property and the cost of the 
repairs will not increase its value to the same extent.34  In undertaking repairs in 
full the mortgagee may well significantly extend the unsecured shortfall.  
                                                 
33
 As noted in the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Property Law (Mortgagor Protection) Amendment 
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Unfortunately, the statutory term „reasonable repairs‟ is not defined.  Muir J in 
Team Dynamik Racing Pty Ltd v Longhurst Racing Pty Ltd (No 2)35 considered 
similar issues and referred to the guidance offered by the statements of Dixon J 
in Southwell v Roberts36 in relation to when a mortgagee may be able to make 
improvements at the cost of the mortgagor as follows: 
The first consideration is the amount of the mortgage debt and the proportion which the 
expenditure bears to it. A mortgagee is a creditor who enjoys rights in the mortgaged 
premises only for the purpose of securing repayment. He ought not to be allowed under 
colour of protecting and effectuating his security to burden the property with a debt out of 
all relation to the principal sum borrowed or the mortgage moneys owing at the time. 
Closely related to this consideration is the effect produced upon the mortgagor's ability to 
redeem. The mortgagee ought not to be allowed against the mortgagor expenditure so 
disproportionate to the mortgage moneys and so out of keeping with the value of the 
security and of the equity of redemption that the mortgagor may be hampered in 
redeeming the property.
37
 
While it may be suggested that the concept of reasonableness should embrace 
not only the cost of the repairs per se but also the value that may be added to the 
mortgaged property by doing the repairs, this position is by no means clear under 
the legislation.  Perhaps the better view is that this may represent a situation 
where the mortgagee may be considered under the terms of the legislation to 
have a „reasonable excuse‟ for not undertaking repairs to the extent quoted. 
 
The situation is further complicated where a second mortgage exists. For 
example, if the mortgaged property has a value greater than the debt owed to the 
first mortgagee but the property is in a dangerous state and not capable of sale, 
the question arises as to the obligation of the first mortgagee to repair given this 
is likely to substantially reduce the second mortgagee‟s secured entitlements.  As 
noted previously, the statutory term „reasonable repairs‟ is not defined.  
Notwithstanding the element of doubt that may have been introduced with the 
amendments to s 85, it is suggested that prudent practice must be for a 
mortgagee to assume that the concept of reasonableness should embrace not 
only the cost of the repairs per se but also the value that may be added to the 
mortgaged property by doing the repairs.  Where the cost of the repairs is likely 
to outweigh the additional value of the mortgaged property (thereby diminishing 
the funds available for distribution to a subsequent mortgagee) a first mortgagee 
will need to proceed with great caution notwithstanding the apparently clear 
statutory mandate in s85(1A) to maintain the mortgaged property. 
 
3.5 Interaction between the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
 
                                                 
35
 [2007] QSC 232. 
36
 (1940) 63 CLR 581, 597-598.  Also, refer to Matzner v Clyde Securities Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 293, 306-
308. 
37
 [2007] QSC 232, [33]. 
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Further difficulties may arise if inadequate attention is paid to the interaction 
between s 85 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and s 420A of the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth).  As specified by s 85(8), nothing in s 85 affects the operation of a 
law of the Commonwealth, including, for example, s 420A of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth).  To the extent of any inconsistency between the State and 
Commonwealth legislation, the Commonwealth legislation will prevail.38  In at 
least two material respects, there are potential inconsistencies between the 
operations of the State and Commonwealth statutory regimes where a corporate 
mortgagor is involved. While these inconsistencies are not new the potential for 
conflict is increased as a result of the extension of the application of s 85 to 
receivers.   
 
Property with or without a market value  
 
The first inconsistency relates to the formulation of the statutory duty.  Section 
420A imposes a duty on a „controller‟.  This term is defined to include a receiver 
or receiver and manager and anyone else who is in possession or control of the 
property of the corporation for the purpose of enforcing a charge.39  The section 
expressly refers to receivers and receivers and managers and will as a result of 
the wide language used also apply to a mortgagee exercising power of sale over 
the property of a corporation when the mortgagee has taken possession or 
control of the corporation‟s property the subject of the mortgage.40 
 
The controller‟s duty of care in exercising power of sale is prescribed by s 
420A.41  The first limb of s 420A(1) imposes an obligation on a controller to take 
all reasonable care to sell the property for not less than its market value.  
Alternatively, if the property does not have a market value, then under the 
second limb the controller‟s obligation is to take all reasonable care to achieve 
the best price that is reasonably obtainable.42 In this regard, circumstances 
existing at the time when the property is sold are relevant.   
 
                                                 
38
 Australian Constitution s 109. 
39
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9. 
40
 While there has been some debate about the application of the section to the situation where the  
mortgage or charge relates to a small part of the assets  of the corporation, the Australian and Securities 
Investment Commission takes the view the section applies in such situations.  See, Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 106.4.  Also see, Tekinvest Pty Ltd v Lazarom (2004) 12 
BPR 23,439; Re Lanepoint Enterprises Pty Ltd: Fraser v Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (2007) 241 ALR 252, [57]. 
41
 There are a number of reported instances where the obligations of a mortgagee exercising power of sale 
over the property of a corporate mortgagor have been considered in light of the obligations imposed by s 
420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  See, eg, Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Elliott & Tuthill 
(Mortgagors) Pty Ltd (2002) 10 BPR 19,565; GE Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 11BPR 20,529; 
Jovanovic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2004) 87 SASR 570; Boman Irani v St George Bank Ltd 
[2007] VSCA 33. 
42
 The limbs of s 420A(1) are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 
106, [33]. 
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Unlike s 85 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), it can be seen that s 420A 
expressly distinguishes between corporate property with a market value and 
corporate property which has no market value.43 While expert evidence may be 
used, the court determines whether property has a market value.44  While there 
are relatively slight differences in statutory wording, the focus of both s 85 and 
the first limb of s 420A(1) is on market value.45  However, only in the second limb 
of s 420A(1) is express provision made for corporate property that does not have 
a determinable market value.  In that instance, the formulation of the obligation 
on sale is cast in different statutory language from s 85. 
 
The potential conflict between the Queensland and Commonwealth legislation 
becomes apparent where the mortgaged property is a unique or iconic property, 
the mortgagor is a corporation and a receiver is appointed.  In selling the 
property of the corporate mortgagor, the receiver will be bound by the obligations 
imposed on a „controller‟ by s 420A.  Further, making the assumption that the 
receiver is „acting under a power delegated to the receiver by a mortgagee‟ the 
receiver may also be bound by the obligation imposed by s 85(1) of the Property 
Law Act 1974 (Qld), at least to the extent that there is no inconsistency with the 
Commonwealth legislation.  If the property is iconic and there is a wide 
discrepancy in valuation evidence, the second limb of s 420A(1) may well be 
applicable.  
 
It can be difficult to determine whether property has a market value for the 
purposes of s420A.46  As observed by Spigelman CJ: 
 
 The central difficulty in the construction of s 420A(1) is that it is premised on the basis 
that there is a category of property that is in fact “sold” but which has no “market value”. 
This incongruity is enough to indicate that a very particular concept of “market value” is 
being employed.
47
 
 
Spigelman CJ considered that two alternative constructions of „market value‟ 
were reasonably arguable.  First, „market value‟ may mean a definite value which 
is clearly established such as a stock exchange price for publicly listed shares or, 
alternatively, a value which is readily determinable based on comparable sales.48  
This analysis has been considered and subsequently applied by Dodds-Streeton 
                                                 
43
 It should be noted the proposed s 111A(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) has been drafted in a 
similar way to s 420A (1) distinguishing between property with and without an ascertainable market value. 
44
 Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd v Orders (2004) 51 ACSR 699, [411]. 
45
Despite the reference in s 420A(1) to ‘all’ reasonable care, the duty under it and s85(3) should be 
regarded as the same: Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162, [27]; 
Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd v Glodale Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 97, [42].  Contrast Jovanovic v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2004) 87 SASR 570, [48] where Gray J said ‘Section 420A imposes no 
lesser duty than that contained in s 85 of the Queensland Property Law Act.  Section 420A may even be 
said to impose a higher duty as the statutory obligation is to take all reasonable care.’ 
46
 Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd v Orders (2004) 51 ACSR 699; Jeogla Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
(1999) 150 FLR 359, [418]; National Transport Insurance Ltd v Smith (2001) 40 ACSR 149, 153-154. 
47
 Skinner v Jeogla (2001) 37 ACSR 106, [37]. 
48
 Ibid [38] – [41]. 
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J in Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd v Orders49 in relation to industry apparel, linen, 
sporting apparel and corporate uniforms which: 
 
did not have a definite value “clearly and obviously established as a market price” or a 
sufficiently certain “determinable value” by reference to closely comparable sales or 
market experience. The Florgale Group stock was very specialised and there was no 
evidence of comparable sales which would permit market value to be readily determined. 
The property indisputably had a narrow or “niche” market.
50
  
 
On the basis of this analysis, where property is unique or iconic and there are 
few comparable sales, it is very likely that the receiver‟s obligation will be 
prescribed by the second limb of s 420A(1).  To the extent that this statutory 
formulation may be seen to be at variance with the obligation that may be 
imposed on the receiver by s 85(1), the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) will prevail.  
 
Guarantors 
 
The second potential area of inconsistency between the State and 
Commonwealth legislation relates to the possible remedies available to 
guarantors for a breach of the statutory obligation.  Section 85(3) of the Property 
Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides a person damnified by the breach of duty with a 
remedy in damages against the mortgagee exercising power of sale.51  The section 
imposes a duty of care in favour of all persons who are „damnified‟ by the 
mortgagee's failure to take reasonable care to ensure that the mortgaged property 
is sold at the market value.  In Higton Enterprises Pty Ltd v BFC Finance Ltd,52 the 
court agreed that guarantors of a mortgage debt whose position is worsened by a 
breach of the duty imposed by s 85 may be persons „damnified by the breach‟ in 
s 85(3).  
 
Unlike s 85(3), s 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not expressly 
confer a right of action upon persons „damnified‟ by the breach.53  While there 
can be no doubt that a guarantor of the debt of a corporate mortgagor may be 
greatly affected by a breach of s 420A, it is unclear whether s 420A creates new 
rights or simply strengthens existing rights.  In this regard, it seems valid to 
question whether s 420A was „merely intended to „control‟ controllers rather than 
to confer rights‟? 54    
 
                                                 
49
 (2004) 51 ACSR 699. 
50
 Ibid [439]. 
51
 Section 90(3) of the Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) makes similar provision.  Also, proposed s 111A (4) 
of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) provides ’a person who suffers loss or damage as a result of a breach 
of duty’ with a remedy in damages.  See, WD Duncan and L Willmott, ‘The Mortgagee’s Scylla and 
Charybidis – That Narrow Path Between the Mortgagor and Purchaser’ (2001) 9 APLJ 129. 
52
 [1997] 1 Qd R 168.   
53
Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd v Orders (2004) 51 ACSR 699 [365]. 
54
 WD Duncan WM Dixon, The Law of Real Property Mortgages, The Federation Press 2007, 269. 
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Bryson J in GE Capital Australia v Davis55 took the view that s 420A is very 
different from s 85 and that because when entering into a guarantee all the 
guarantor does is guarantee the obligation of the corporation to a third party 
rather than, for example, taking an interest in the mortgaged property, the 
guarantor has no right to damages or any other remedy under s 420A.  The 
legislation makes it clear what the controller has to do but is silent on the 
consequences when there is a failure to do so.  Arguably while s 420A does not 
vest a new cause of action in a guarantor, what it does is to provide a new test 
for determining when the controller has breached its equitable duty.  Bryson J 
opined: 
 
[T]he section enhances the duty of the controller and the protection afforded to the 
corporation.  This is achieved, and the apparent legislative intention is fulfilled without 
altering the remedies available to the corporation for breach of obligation in exercising the 
power of sale, and without altering the means available for obtaining remedies.  Where 
real property subject to a mortgage has been sold and the mortgagor succeeds in 
establishing that there has been a sacrifice of the mortgagor's interest in the exercise of 
the power of sale the mortgagor's remedy is to be credited compensation when accounts 
are taken of the mortgage debt.  Section 420A(1) alters this scheme by inserting a more 
stringent rule, but does not otherwise change the scheme.
56 
 
If the guarantor is able to show a breach of duty as against the mortgagor 
entitling the mortgagor to a remedy under s 420A(1), the guarantor would also be 
entitled to a remedy but through „an equitable defence to the claim against them, 
subject to the provisions of the guarantee.‟57  While the guarantor will be entitled 
to an equitable set-off58 if sued by the creditor, given this approach it is unlikely 
there will be a right to equitable damages upon a breach of s420A.59 
 
Given the differences in statutory treatment, when the duties imposed by s 85 
and s 420A are both breached there is the potential for confusion as to the 
appropriate remedy.60 A failure to draw a distinction between the remedial 
operation of s 85 and s 420A only further serves to highlight the difficulties that 
may arise in this area of practice. 
                                                 
55
 (2002) 11BPR 20,529, [45]. 
56
 Ibid [53]. 
57
 Ibid [92].  
58
 Jovanovic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2004) 87 SASR 570; Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162, [11]. 
59
 It is curious that in framing the legislation, regard was not paid to the recommendation in the Harmer 
Report that guarantors should have an independent right of action. See Australian Law Reform 
Commission Report No 45, 1988, vol 1, para 234. 
60
 See, eg, Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd v Glodale Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 97, [102] where the Victorian 
Court of Appeal considered the remedy available to the mortgagor corporation in circumstances where 
there was a breach of both s 85 and s 420A and whether the trial judge should have ordered an account of 
profits rather than damages. While it was ultimately decided that the method of calculation was the same, 
this decision illustrates the potential for confusion. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
The level of statutory prescription imposed in Queensland upon a mortgagee or 
receiver in relation to a sale under a prescribed mortgage is without precedent 
elsewhere in Australia.  As demonstrated in this article, there are many facets of 
the operation of the amended legislation that are likely to prove problematic in 
their day-to-day operation.  Given this, and the significant penalty associated with 
failure to comply with the legislation, it may be considered unfortunate that these 
amendments to the Queensland legislation were introduced without the benefit of 
any consultation process.  The aphorism „more haste less speed‟ would seem 
apposite. 
